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Quotes about Sanger. There is a striking kinship between our movement and Margaret Sanger's early efforts. She, like we, saw the horrifying conditions of ghetto life. King Philip's War in New England (America's First Major Indian War) by Michael Tougias. The bloodiest war in America's history, on a per capita basis, took place in. Jill Lepore: A Personal Tea Party History When historian Jill Lepore stumbled on a letter from John Adams about the lies of American history, it brought to mind her. Carb cycling is the foundation of what my husband, Chris, and I do every day and with every client. We know through years of experience with many different.
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New York Times. Consultado em Sept 2. Consultado em 1. 9 de maio de 2. The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History. ISBN 9. 78- 0. 69.
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Who is and who is not a populist these days? On one hand, liberals seem to be worried about increasingly illiberal groups, and often equate populism with nationalism or plain xenophobia; on the other, there are theorists of democracy – as well as intellectuals inside parties such as Syriza and Podemos – who are concerned about the rise of what they see as a . One of these perspectives, one would have thought, must be wrong. Or is there somehow a sure way of telling . In the United States, the word populism is today mostly associated with the idea of a genuinely egalitarian leftwing politics – in potential conflict with a Democratic party which, in the eyes of populist critics, has become too centrist. In particular, the defenders of . But even prospective presidential candidate Hillary Clinton is now sometimes said to strike a .
In north America, . Both have variously been described as populist, even to the point where a coalition has been suggested between rightwing and leftwing forces critical of mainstream politics, with populism as its common denominator. In short, we seem to be facing a conceptual cacophony: almost anything – left, right, democratic, anti- democratic, liberal, illiberal, Syriza and its nationalist (some would say racist) coalition partner, the . Or so it seems. To find some way out of this confusion, I shall suggest in this essay an understanding of populism that brings out clearly what I consider to be the crucial differences between populism and proper democracy.
I believe the left has nothing to gain from styling itself as . At the same time, they should reject the label . One should not want to be a populist, and one should bat away the accusation of being a populist, when this is no more than a label to discredit unorthodox policies (even where, in the case of Syriza, this is what used to be considered, for the most part, Keynesian orthodoxy). Populism: a very brief history. The word . Since Greek and Roman times, the latter has been used in at least three different senses, each historically significant and influential. First, the people as the whole: all members of the polity, or the .
Second, the people as the . And, third and last, the people as the nation, understood in a distinctly cultural sense. Less obviously, advocacy for the . Rather, what I consider the core claim of all populists is this: that only a part of the people is really . From this perspective, it is plausible that something called .
The fact that both movements had something to do with farmers and peasants gave rise to the notion – prevalent until at least the 1. While that association is largely lost today, the particular origins of populism in the US still suggest to many observers that populism must – at least on some level – be . This particular understanding is reinforced by a look at the politics of Latin America, where the advocates of populism have always stressed its inclusionary and emancipatory character in what remains, after all, the economically most unequal continent on the globe. To be clear, one cannot simply eradicate these existing, normative associations – historical languages are what they are. But we have to allow for the possibility that a plausible understanding of populism will end up excluding historical movements and actors who explicitly called themselves .
After all, with very few exceptions, historians would not argue that a proper understanding of socialism needs to make room for National Socialism, despite the Nazis’ own proclamations. As noted above, the association of populism with . In Europe, one finds a different historically conditioned conception. There populism is associated, primarily by liberal commentators, with irresponsible policies or some form of political pandering (indeed, demagoguery and populism are often used interchangeably). However, populism is also frequently identified with a particular class, especially the petite bourgeoisie and – at least until peasants disappeared from the European political imagination in the last quarter of the 2. This might seem like a sociologically robust theory: classes are constructs, of course, but they can be empirically specified in fairly plausible ways.
But such theories usually come with a much more speculative account of social psychology: those espousing populist claims publicly and, in particular, those casting their ballot for populist parties, are said to be driven by . Finally, populists are often said to be espousing . First, the focus on particular socioeconomic groups is empirically dubious, as has been shown in a number of studies.
Second, the concentration on political psychology is not necessarily wholly misguided, but it is hard to see that certain emotions could only be found among populist politicians and their followers; and again, some of these psychological approaches are intimately tied to modernisation theory (people are said to experience resentment in reaction to modernisation, and then to long to retain or return to a . Of course, it is impossible to deny that some policies really do turn out to have been conceived irresponsibly: the crucial decision- makers didn’t think hard enough, failed to gather all the relevant facts, or – most plausibly – ignored the likely long- term consequences in favour of short- term electoral benefits for themselves. Truly, such concerns are not the product of a neoliberal delusion – but they do not serve to delimit populism. There is in most cases no clear, uncontested line between responsibility and irresponsibility. Often enough, charges of .
Of course, this constellation of claims then reinforces the sense among those in favour of populism – as we see particularly in Latin America – to embrace the very label that is supposed to discredit them. What populism is. So how should we think about populism instead, then? Populism, I suggest, is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world which places in opposition a morally pure and fully unified people against small minorities, elites in particular, who are placed outside the authentic people. Rather, as the important theorist of modern democracy Claude Lefort once put it, for populists, first . Political actors not committed to this claim, according to my understanding, are simply not populists. Populists pit the pure, innocent, always hard- working people against a corrupt elite who do not genuinely work (other than to further their self- interest), and also, in rightwing populism, against the very bottom of society (who also, ostensibly, do not really work but live off others).
Rightwing populists typically construe an . But this criterion does not have to be work.
Yet it is a mistake to think that populism will always reveal itself to be a form of nationalism. In fact, critics of populism today make it too easy for themselves if they assume that populism is just ethnic chauvinism. Indeed, one should give populists the benefit of the doubt and concede that, in many cases, they operate with an understanding of the common good that is close to epistemic conceptions of democracy, as opposed to defaulting into using ethnic markers of difference. Populists can and often do rely on the notion that there is a distinct common good, that the people can discern and will it, and that a politician or a party (or, less plausibly, a movement) could unambiguously implement such a conception of the common good as policy.
This emphasis on one common good, clearly comprehensible to common sense, and capable of being articulated as one correct policy that then can be collectively willed, at least partly explains why populism is so often charged with oversimplifying policy challenges. The specifically moral conception of politics which populists espouse has two important implications.
First, populists do not have to be against the idea of political representation as such; rather, they can positively endorse a particular version of it.